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I. INTRODUCTION
During a state visit in 1983, the leaders of the U.S. and Israel agreed
to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement. Negotiations commenced shortly
afterwards and concluded on April 22, 1985, with the signing of the Israel-
United States: Free Trade Area Agreement ("FTA").' The FTA was the
first free trade agreement entered into by the U.S.
2
In 1988, the U.S. entered into its second free trade agreement. This
was the Canada-United States: Free Trade Agreement.3 This bilateral
agreement was subsequently replaced in 1992 with the tripartite North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), 4 signed between Mexico, the
U.S., and Canada. The Canadian and U.S. governments agreed that upon
the NAFTA coming into effect, any provision of the Can.-U.S. FTA that
was not incorporated into the NAFTA would be suspended until the
NAFTA was terminated, or either Canada or the U.S. withdrew from the
NAFTA.
The FTA and its comparison with the NAFTA is the subject of this
paper. The first section of the paper discusses the special circumstances
that influenced both the U.S. and Israel to negotiate a free trade agreement.
Special emphasis is placed upon the political and economic context in
which the agreement was signed. The second section compares the FTA
and the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms. An effective dispute
resolution mechanism is essential to facilitate the proper operation and
future success of international trade agreements. As Judge Lauterpacht of
the International Court of Justice said: "[M]ost so-called conflicts of
interests are due, not to economic necessities, but to the imperfections of
international legal organization, in particular to the legal admissibility of
force and the absence of judicial settlement."' Finally, this paper reflects
upon the current U.S. trade policy and suggests directions the U.S. will
take when negotiating future trade agreements.
1. Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M. 645 [hereinafter
FTA].
2. FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 5 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1989).
3. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281
[hereinafter Can.-U.S. FTA].
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter
NAFTA].




IL BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE FTA
A. The Political Background of the FTA
The formation of the FTA was greatly influenced by the strong
political and military ties that existed between the U.S. and Israel. Since
its creation in 1948, Israel has enjoyed uncontroversial support from the
U.S., its most important as well as visible political and military ally.
Although the main objective of the U.S. when negotiating the FTA was to
strengthen this political relationship,6 Israel's key consideration for
negotiating the agreement was economic. A recognition of these different
motivations is important since the FTA was the first U.S. attempt to
negotiate a comprehensive, bilateral trade-liberalizing agreement.7 Israel
was a perfect test case for the operation of such an agreement. 8 As the
U.S.'s primary objective was to strengthen the U.S.-Israel political ties,
there was little risk that trade concessions would provoke political
opposition in the U.S. 9
A free trade deal was seen by the U.S. as a way to strengthen Israel
politically in the Middle East. The FTA was a means for the U.S. to
manifest its unconditional support of Israel. Israel's need for U.S. military
support was less significant because it had engaged in peace negotiations
with some of its Arab neighbors, and the idea of peace settlements, at least
with some of these countries, appeared realistic. Soviet influence, however,
was still substantial in the Middle East, and a new move by the U.S. was
needed to manifest its support of Israel.
As mentioned above, Israel was the best candidate for the first U.S.
bilateral free trade agreement. The U.S. considered Israel the only
democratic government in the Middle East. Its existence therefore, fit
within the "American ideology," which seeks democratic institutions that
form policy based on similar morals and principles.' °
The U.S.'s interest in solidifying diplomatic and economic ties with
Israel was strengthened by the fact that the U.S. regarded Israel as a
6. Schott, supra note 2, at 5.
7. Schott, supra note 2, at 5.
8. Schott, supra note 2, at 5.
9. Schott, supra note 2, at 5. The other reason that contributed to the lack of opposition
to the agreement within the U.S. was that U.S. trade with Israel was not a significant share
of the overall U.S. trade. Id.
10. BERNARD RIECH, THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL INFLUENCE IN THE SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP 177 (1984).
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strategic political asset." In fact, Israel has been supportive of U.S. policy
in the United Nations, more than any other state, and has voted with the
U.S. 86.2% of the time.12 This pattern suggests a parallelism between the
two countries on various international issues.' 3
The strategic value of Israel was even greater during the 1970s and the
80s when the Soviet Union was still a superpower. Political alliance with
Israel was considered to be of national security to the U.S. because Israel
was regarded as the bulwark against Soviet penetration and domination of
the Middle East.'4 The U.S. believed that the communist Soviet Union was
seeking to undermine any Western-oriented regimes in the Middle East. 5
In this context, it is important to remember that in the 70s and 80s, the
U.S. relationship with Israel was strong because the Soviet Union broke-off
its diplomatic relationship with Israel. It was therefore believed that Israel
would be the one country in the Middle East that would stand in the way
of the Soviet domination in the region.
Furthermore, the U.S. also believed that special support to Israel was
strategically necessary for any U.S. attempt to block radical Arab
expansion. Throughout the 60s, Israel reduced the ability of many Arab
states to pursue their expansionist efforts. As the Arab states were
supported by (and supporting of) the Soviet Union's policies, particularly
after the 60s, Arab expansion was perceived by the U.S. as a direct threat
to its security.
Finally, U.S. interest in Israel was increased by a vocal and politically
active domestic Jewish community which was unified and motivated to
work on Israel's behalf.' 6 The Jewish vote was (and is) particularly
important because, although not significant in numbers, it tends to be
politically active. 7 Thus, the Jewish community produces something of a
multiplier effect on their votes, exerting an influence out of proportion to
their numbers." Indeed, in 1985, with an upcoming presidential election,
President Ronald Reagan sought to gain the support of the Jewish vote."
A new free trade agreement, aimed at benefiting the struggling Israeli




15. Id. at 179-80.
16. Id. at 193.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 192.
19. Schott, supra note 2, at 109.
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economy, was seen by President Reagan as the best manifestation of the
continuing American support of Israel.2°
B. The Economic Background of the FTA
The FTA must also be seen within the context of each country's
broader trade policy objectives. Though the U.S. was primarily motivated
by politics, 2' Israel's major impetus for negotiating a bilateral trade
agreement with the U.S. was economic. 22 Prior to 1985, approximately
25% of Israeli exports were to the U.S. and 16% of Israeli imports were
from the U.S. 23 In contrast, only 1% of U.S. export were to Israel and
only .5% of U.S. imports were from Israel.2 4 Thus, pure economic
considerations were less important for the U.S. than they were for Israel.
Nevertheless, some economic considerations led both the U.S. and Israel
to sign the Agreement.
1. The U.S. Economic Considerations for Entering the FIA
a. The E.E.C.-Israel Agreement
In 1975, Israel and the E.E.C. (now the E.U.) entered into a
preferential trade agreement. 25 This was a result of their previously
existing relationship as well as the emergence of new policies within the
E.E.C.26 The Agreement was aimed at reducing tariffs on Israeli and E.E.C.
goods, and fostering economic activity by promoting trade expansion and
cooperation in reciprocal areas of interest.27 Under the agreement, the
preferences accorded to E.E.C. suppliers discriminated against U.S. exports
to Israel.28 U.S. goods which entered Israel were subject to high customs
20. Schott, supra note 2, at 109.
21. Schott, supra note 2, at 109.
22. Schott, supra note 2, at 106.
23. Schott, supra note 2, at 110.
24. Schott, supra note 2, at 110.
25. Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel,
May 11, 1975, E.E.C.-Isr., 1975 O.J. (L 136) 3.
26. Ira Nikelsberg, The Ability to Use Israel's Preferential Trade Status with Both the
United States and the European Community to Overcome Potential Trade Barriers, 24 GEo.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 371, 372 (1990).
27. Id. at 373-74.
28. Avraham Azrieli, Improving Arbitration Under the U.S.-Israel Free Trade
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duties; E.E.C. goods which entered Israel did so duty free.29 To correct the
new disadvantage faced by its exporters, the U.S. found it necessary to
negotiate the FTA with Israel. From the U.S. perspective, the FTA was a
third-country response to trade policies between two other trading parties.
Thus, a free trade agreement with Israel was a mechanism to compete more
efficiently with duty-free European goods.3"
b. Advance of Trade Policy
Even before the FTA was signed, U.S. trade policy was in favor of
multilateral negotiations. One may ask then, why did the U.S. enter into
negotiations with Israel to create a bilateral agreement? First, Israel was
the only country in the Middle East that could have had comprehensive
trade agreements with the U.S. because many Arab countries were
receiving aid from and were under the influence of the Soviet Union.
Second, the U.S. wanted to convince other countries that there were
alternatives to multilateral negotiations.
At the time before the FTA negotiations began, the U.S. was eager to
advance the Uruguay Round of the GATT multilateral negotiations. In
1982, however, the GATT Ministerial Meeting had not yielded a significant
advance towards completing the negotiations. 3' Essentially, the FTA was
used by the U.S. as a threat that U.S. policy would shift from supporting
multilateral agreements to supporting bilateral agreements.32 This U.S.
tactic would be helpful in getting GATT countries to cooperate with the
U.S. efforts to launch the multilateral GATT negotiations.33
In the alternative, as a result of the failure of the 1982 GATT meeting,
the U.S. sincerely considered negotiating directly with any partner that
would be willing to enter into negotiations towards a bilateral free trade
agreement.3 Thus, American trade officials viewed a bilateral agreement
with Israel as an easy test case which would not harm the U.S. balance of
trade.35
Agreement: A Framework for a Middle-East Free Trade Zone, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 187,
195 (1993); Schott, supra note 2, at 5.
29. Nikelsberg, supra note 26, at 375.
30. Nikelsberg, supra note 26, at 375.
31. Schott, supra note 2, at 109.
32. Schott, supra note 2, at 109.
33. Schott, supra note 2, at 109.
34. Schott, supra note 2, at 109.
35. Schott, supra note 2, at 109. At that time less than 1% of all American imports was
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The result was both the continuation of the American policy towards
multilateral agreements and the creation of a experimental bilateral
agreement - the FTA. Arguably, the threat posed by the rapid completion
of the FTA was effective in forcing the GATT parties to begin the
Uruguay Round. The U.S. used the FTA not only as a prototype agreement
for other bilateral agreements, but also for advancing and structuring future
multilateral agreements. Thus, after entering into an agreement with Israel,
the U.S. entered into a free trade agreement with Canada,36 and started
negotiations towards a trilateral free trade agreement with Canada and
Mexico.
37
c. Israel's Dependency on the U.S.
Another economic incentive for the U.S. to enter into a free trade
agreement with Israel was the opportunity to improve Israel's economic
situation by encouraging self-sufficiency and reducing dependence on U.S.
aid.38 In 1985, when the FTA came into force, U.S. aid to Israel constituted
20% of Israel's total government budget.39 Taking into consideration the
military aid Israel received from the U.S., the numbers indicate that Israel
received a major part of all U.S. foreign aid.4°
The U.S. believed that free trade with Israel would develop the Israeli
economy and reduce its dependence on U.S. economic aid.4' By allowing
U.S. imports into Israel duty-free, the U.S. hoped that the Israeli
government would be able to reduce inflationary pressures within Israel,
and that Israeli industry would be forced to become more efficient and
competitive. Thus, a strengthening of Israeli industry would be met with
a corresponding reduction in subsidies by the Israeli government. This in
turn would reduce Israeli dependence on U.S. aid. Furthermore, duty-free
Israeli imports into the U.S. would facilitate the accessibility of Israeli
products to the U.S. market. The U.S. believed that this was another
necessary component in stabilizing the Israeli economy so that the Israeli
government could meet its international financial obligations, which were
composed primarily of debts owed to the U.S.
42
from Israel and less than 1% of all American exports was to Israel. Id.
36. Can.-U.S. FTA, supra note 3.
37. NAFTA, supra note 4.
38. Nikelsberg, supra note 26, at 376.
39. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 195.
40. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 195.
41. Nikelsberg, supra note 26, at 376.
42. Nikelsberg, supra note 26, at 376. In 1985, Israel's debt to the U.S. was $8.8
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2. Israel's Economic Considerations for Entering the FTA
a. The U.S. General System of Preferences (GSP)
43
Israel saw the FTA as an assurance that its economic status in the U.S
would remain strong despite the anticipated termination of the GSP. Under
the Most Favored Nation (MFN) or GSP status, 90% of imported Israeli
products enjoyed duty-free access to the U.S. market." In 1984, however,
(the year prior to the signing of the FTA), the U.S. had a growing trade
deficit. Israel was concerned that the GSP program would either be
significantly curtailed or even terminated. Israeli officials decided to seek
a separate agreement with the U.S. to ensure that the benefits flowing from
these preferences would be maintained. Furthermore, Israel also recognized
that free trade would be advantageous in expanding the number of its
goods that would enjoy this status. Goods that, at the time, were not
covered by the GSP would become exportable to the U.S. duty-free.45
A free trade agreement was the medium through which Israel could
maintain accessibility to the U.S. market. Without such an agreement,
Israel believed that it would lose a large share of its primary export market.
Israel's fears were not unfounded. Though the GSP Act had been renewed
for an eight year period, it had been amended and became more
restrictive.46 Israel managed to avoid the effect of these amendments by
negotiating the FTA.
b. The Arab Boycott and Israel's Neighbors
The Arab Boycott of Israeli products was in place ever since Israel
was created in 1948. This forced Israel to seek potential markets beyond
its immediate neighbors. The Arab Boycott of Israel officially began in
December 1945 when the Arab League issued the first formal Boycott
declaration. 47 Resolution 16 stated that "Jewish products and manufactured
billion, or 73% of its total foreign aid debt of $12 billion. Congress Wants to Amend
Foreign Military Laws, STATES NEWS SERV., Dec. 31, 1985, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File.
43. Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98
Stat. 3018 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465). The GSP allows the U.S.
to give trade preferences to developing countries. Id. § 501.
44. Nikelsberg, supra note 26, at 374.
45. Nikelsberg, supra note 26, at 374.
46. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1994).
47. DAN S. CHILL, THE ARAB BoYcoTr OF ISRAEL EcoNoMic AGGRESSION AND
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goods shall be considered undesirable... [and that] merchants, commission
agents and individuals ...[should] refuse to deal in, distribute, or consume
Zionist products or manufactured goods."4 This resolution was the primary
Boycott. The effect of the primary Boycott was twofold. First, it effectively
barred the importation of Israeli goods into neighboring countries. Second,
because Israeli exports had to be shipped to remote markets, their high
transportation costs were reflected in higher market prices in the remote
market.
The Arab Boycott was later extended. A secondary boycott was
applied against companies that dealt with Israel.49 Companies that traded
their goods with Israel could not market their goods in the Arab markets.
The effect of the secondary boycott was substantial as well. To avoid being
"blacklisted" by the Arab League, firms tended to avoid any trade with
Israel, and therefore complied with the Boycott.
While many countries indirectly condemned the Boycott as illegal and
discriminatory, only the U.S. made practical attempts to alleviate its harsh
effects. In 1979, the U.S. passed an anti-boycott statute50 that subjected
companies to prosecution for compelling or cooperating with the boycott.
51
The effect of the secondary boycott was, therefore, partially remedied.
However, without a special treatment to remedy the effect of the primary
Boycott, Israel found it increasingly difficult to market its products
competitively because many of its surrounding neighbors saw it in their
"National Interest" to economically isolate Israel. Thus, new markets in
which Israeli products would be competitive were essential. In light of
these concerns, and with the anticipated expiration of the GSP in 1984,52
Israel believed that it was vital to enter into a special agreement with the
U.S. Such an agreement would open the U.S. market to Israeli products
despite the fact that the price of these products was inflated as a result of
increased transportation cost. The preferences accorded to Israeli products
under the agreement would decrease their U.S. retail price, and thus make
WORLD REACTION 1 (1976).
48. Id.; see also A rab-Israel Conflict and the United Nations, 8 INT'L REV. SERVICE 30,
30 (A.G. Mezerik ed. 1976).
49. Mezerik, supra note 48. In fact it was more than that. It was directed against, inter
alia, any firm that had at least one Jewish employee. For a full discussion of the extent of
the Arab Boycott see CHILL, supra, note 47, at 5-29.
50. The Act was the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 2407, 2410
(West 1996).
51. Nikelsberg, supra, note 26, at 404.
52. I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS SYSTEM UNDER STRESS 79 (1986).
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them more competitive with similar products imported into the U.S. from
other countries.
c. Generally-Strengthening the Israeli Economy
Israel had other economic incentives which favored the formation of
the FTA. First, Israel was interested in reducing its dependence on foreign
aid. Israel hoped that cheap U.S. import products brought about by free
trade would mobilize local industry into becoming more efficient and
competitive. Israel was also interested in reducing its subsidies to
productive industries and developing a more independent economy.53
Second, Israel believed that free trade with the U.S. would increase its
exports. This has been proven correct. From 1989 to 1990, Israeli exports
to the U.S. increased by 2.3%. 4 This figure represents a significant growth
in trade between the parties in the years following the signing of the
FTA.55
In sum, both the U.S. and Israel had economic incentives that favored
an increase in free trade. Although Israel's economic incentives were much
greater than those of the U.S., economic considerations on the American
side as well favored entering into a free trade agreement with Israel.
C. An Overview of the FTA
The FTA is comprised of a Preamble, twenty-three separate Articles
and four Annexes.56 The Preamble lists the aims of the FTA. Among the
aims listed, two are of particular interest. The first includes a statement of
the political aim of the Agreement, namely, the desire to further the
historic friendship between the U.S. and Israel. Another important
provision grants Israel the status of a "developing" country. This
recognition is important because it means that the preferential treatment
enjoyed by developing countries applies equally to Israel.
The following are the main provisions of the FTA. Article 1
establishes that the FTA is a bilateral agreement consistent with the GATT.
Article 4 restricts the right of either party to impose new trade restrictions
unless permitted by the Agreement. Article 5 sets forth actions that a party
may take to provide relief for an industry that is seriously injured by
53. Schatt, supra nite 2, ,a 107.
54. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 196.
55. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 196.
56. FTA, supra note 1.
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increased importation of a particular product. Article 6 provides an
exception to Article 4 if the restriction is based on an agricultural policy
consideration. Article 7 incorporates GATT Article XX (General
Exceptions) and Article XXI (Security Exceptions). Article 8 provides a
special exception for trade measures, imposed by either nation, relating to
religious or ritual prohibitions such as Kosher restrictions. Article 12
provides for a licensing procedure. Article 14 reaffirms both nations'
existing obligations with respect to intellectual property rights. Article 17
establishes a Joint Committee to supervise the proper implementation of the
Agreement. Article 18 articulates the procedure to be employed before
either party takes any trade restrictive measure with respect to products
traded between the parties. Article 19 establishes the dispute settlement
process. Article 20 provides for the change in duty that either party may
make as a result of substantial fluctuations in its currency. Article 21
provides for the procedure a party may take when it changes its tariff
schedules.
Annexes 1 and 2 provide the schedule of tariff reductions for both the
U.S. and Israel. To facilitate a smooth transition, the parties agreed to
separate products into four classes.57 Annex 3 defines the Rules of Origin
that are used to identify which products are subject to the FTA. Annex 4
contains a letter to the U.S. Ambassador from the Israeli government with
respect to the Israeli undertaking to eliminate its export subsidies.
I. A COMPARISON OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS UNDER THE FVA AND NAF'A
A. General
The dispute mechanisms under the FTA and NAFTA are different in
many respects. Generally, the dispute settlement provisions in the NAFTA
are more comprehensive and detailed than the provisions of the FTA. 8 One
may assume that this is so due to the fact that the FTA was the first trade
agreement entered into by U.S., but such a conclusion is only partially
correct.
The major reason for the flaws in the FTA is a combination of two
factors. First, arbitration clauses are drafted, usually, in the "rosy dawn of
a relationship" which does not necessarily reflect the attitude of the parties
57. Sandra Ward, The U.S.-Israel Free Trade A rew Is it GA TT Legal, 19 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 199, 217 (1985).
58. See discussion infra Part III.B; see also infra app.I.
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during later disputes.59 Secondly, the FTA was in fact drafted within the
context of positive diplomatic relations and continued friendship between
the two countries. 60 These two factors created a misleading belief that
disagreements could always be resolved in a conciliatory atmosphere. As
a result, the dispute settlement mechanism provided in the FTA lacks
specificity in its procedural rules, and it does not deal with fundamental
problems which are most likely to arise during the proceedings.6'
Furthermore, because these provisions are not comprehensive, Israel, as the
economically weaker party to the agreement, is often left without a means
to assert its rights against the U.S.
62
B. An Overview of the Two Mechanisms
Article 19 of the FTA articulates the dispute resolution procedure to
be applied by the parties. Under the NAFTA, Chapter 20 sets forth the
mechanism to resolve disputes among the parties. 63 These two mechanisms
cover disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
Agreements, alleged violations of the Agreements or impairments of
benefits accorded by the Agreements.64 Both mechanisms use the process
of consultation to achieve resolutions. 65 This process is an attempt to
resolve disputes by way of cooperation in order to arrive at resolutions that
are mutually acceptable between the parties.
When resolutions cannot be achieved through consultation, both the
FTA and NAFTA mechanisms provide for a panel review of the matter.
66
59. Garlee Cox, The Selection Process and Appointment of Arbitrators, ARB. J. (June
1991) at 28.
60. See discussion supra Part hl.A.
61. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19.
62. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 203, 205. Note that similar fears led Canada to demand
and achieve a much more detailed mechanism in the Canada-U.S. FTA so that the
mechanism could be successful and fair. See Avraham Azrieli, Dispute Resolution Under
Chapter 18 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, I AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
419, 420 (1991).
63. The NAFTA contains number of mechanisms for resolving disputes between its
parties. This paper concentrates on the general dispute mechanism in Chapter 20. As to the
imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing duties, the FTA excludes any dispute
settlement. Chapter 19 of the NAFTA is the Chapter dealing with disputes with respect to
these kind of duties. NAFTA, supra note 4.
64. See discussion infra Part II.C
65. See discussion infra Part III.C.3
66. See discussion infra Part III.C.4.a
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The FTA and NAFTA articulate a selection process to be utilized in
choosing panel members.67 Panel composition is important because it lends
integrity to the dispute settlement process. By employing an independent
panel to review a dispute, the resolution will be impartial and thus more
likely to be accepted by the disputing parties. Both agreements also place
time limits on each stage of the dispute settlement process to ensure that
speedy resolutions may be achieved.68
In both the FTA and NAFTA, panel decisions do not have a binding
effect on domestic law. These decisions do not create new domestic law
and are not enforceable through the courts of a losing party. Thus, under
both the FTA and NAFTA, if a party refuses to bring its trade practice into
conformity with an adverse panel decision, the only recourse available to
the other party is the suspension of some benefit accorded by the
Agreement.
69
C. A Comparative A nalysis of the Two Mechanisms
1. Jurisdiction
Article 19 of the FTA has general jurisdiction over disputes arising
"...whenever a party considers that the other party has failed to carry out
its obligations...under the Agreement."70 It also governs disputes concerning
the interpretation of the Agreement.
In comparison, Article 2004 of the NAFTA provides for jurisdiction
to deal with "...disputes between the parties regarding the interpretation or
application of this Agreement or wherever a party considers that an actual
or proposed measure of another party is or would be inconsistent with the
",71obligation of this Agreement....
Generally, jurisdiction over dispute settlement is similar under both
Articles. Both dispute mechanisms are designed to deal with situations
where measures taken by one party, though consistent with the obligations
of the Agreements, have an unacceptable effect.
67. See discussion infra Part III.C.4.b.
68. See infra app. I.
69. Gary N. Horlick and F. Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution under the NA FTA
Building on the U.S.-Canada FTA, GA TT and ICSID, 27 1. WORLD TRADE 21, 36 (1993).
70. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(a).
71. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2004.
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2. "Nullification and Impairment" Versus "Distortion of Benefits' Balance"
Article 2004 of the NAFTA provides that the provisions of the dispute
settlement mechanism may apply with respect to incidents where consistent
measures by one party cause "...nullification or impairment.... of benefits
that could reasonably have been expected to accrue to the other party.73 In
contrast, Article 19 of the FTA provides that the dispute settlement
mechanism applies in cases where the consistent measures "...severely
distort the balance of trade benefits .... ,74 under the Agreement.
Two major differences exist with respect to these two provisions. First,
the NAFTA Article 2004 wording results in a less tolerant approach with
respect to consistent measures that have the effect of harming benefits in
some way. Some measures that would be accepted under the FTA may be
unacceptable under the NAFTA because measures can impair benefits
while they do not change the balance of trade benefits. As an example,
suppose the U.S. imposed a measure restricting the sale of a particular
product, but such a restriction was consistent with the Agreements:
Suppose further that as a Tesult of this measure, the cost of pToducing the
product increases substantially. Under the NAFTA, a party may have
recourse to dispute settlement if it can prove that any benefit it reasonably
expects to accrue under the Agreement is impaired. Under the FTA,
however, such a measure may be allowed if both parties are affected in the
same way. For example, if all imported and locally produced products are
affected equally, then the balance of the trade benefits is maintained.
The second difference involves the extent of the protection provided
when consistent measures are being taken. Under the NAFTA, a party has
recourse to dispute settlement in any case where it considers that there is
an impairment of a benefit that "...could reasonably [be] expected... 05
[Emphasis added]. Under the FTA the benefits protected are those
accorded by [the] Agreement.... 76 Thus, under the NAFTA provision it is
sufficient if one party reasonably believes that there is an impairment of
its benefits. This suggests a tendency to support the position of the
complaining party.
In summary, the NAFTA provides better protection than the FTA in
cases where the measures taken by one party, though consistent with the
72. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2004.
73. NkFTA, supra wote 4, art. 2004; see also id. Anntex 2004-t.
74. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(a).
75. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2004, Annex 2004:1.
76. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1.
[Vol. 17
MOTIVATIONS AND MODELS
Agreement, impair a benefit reasonably expected, but not explicitly
provided for by the Agreement. Finally, the dispute settlement mechanism
in the NAFTA is more readily available in such cases.7
3. The Amicable Phase
a. Consultations and Cooperation
Both the NAFTA and FTA dispute resolution mechanisms begin with
the process of consultation. Article 2003 of the NAFTA provides that the
disputing parties "shall [make every effort] through cooperation and
consultations to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any
[dispute]. 78 Under the FTA, when a dispute arises the parties "shall make
every attempt to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution through
consultations. 09
The language of the two Articles are very similar. However, the
procedure for consultations under the FTA is not as specifically defined as
it is under the NAFTA Article 2006. Arguably, the language of Article
19:1(b) in the FTA includes the specifications under Article 2006:5 in
NAFTA. Nevertheless, Article 2006:5 is not open to such ambiguities. For
example Article 2006:5(a) provides that in order to achieve a mutually
satisfying resolution, "the consulting parties must provide sufficient
information to enable full examination of how.. . the measure ... might
affect the operation of the Agreement., 80 It also provides that the parties
"must seek to avoid any resolution that adversely affects the interests under
the Agreement of any other party.'' Additionally, under the NAFTA the
request for consultations must be in writing,82 and the maximum period
allowable for a resolution by consultations is forty five days.
8 3
The procedure for consultations is not as specific under the FTA
dispute settlement mechanism.84 This lack of specification suggests that
77. Of course the complaining party will have to prove that the benefits impaired were
reasonably expected. This will have to be based on the reading of the NAFTA. NAFTA,
supra note 4, Annex 2004:1.
78. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2003; see also id. art. 2006.
79. FI'A, supra note 1, art. 19:1(b).
80. NAFTA, supra note 4.
81. NAFTA, supra note 4.
82. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2006:1.
83. NAFI'A, supra note 4, art. 2007:1(b).
84. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 19.
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trade officials on both sides keep such open channels of communication
that any issue may be raised.85 It reflects the parties preference and desire
to achieve an agreement by allowing consultations in any time, place or
form. Only after the consulting parties have exhausted all available means
of consultations and negotiations should they proceed to the more formal
and adversarial procedure for dispute settlement. Over emphasis on mutual
understanding can be counter-productive. As the FTA places no time limits
on the consultation phase of dispute settlement, a party may be tempted to
stretch the process of consultations as long as possible if it believes that it
will gain by delaying the resolution.
In summary, the FTA does not provide an effective consultation
mechanism for resolving a "real" dispute, that is, a dispute in which the
parties have a sincere and substantial disagreement. It is not unsafe to
assume that during times of a less amiable political relationship between
the U.S. and Israel, the consultation phase will be ineffective.
b. The Joint Committee and the Commission
Under both the FTA and NAFTA, a failure to resolve a dispute
through consultations entitles the parties to apply for a more formal forum
to resolve the dispute. Again, the procedure found in the FTA is not as
detailed as that provided in the NAFTA.
Article 19:1(c) of the FTA provides that either party may refer a
matter in dispute to the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee is the forum
in charge of supervising the implementation of the FTA.8 6 It may also
delegate this power to the various working groups it establishes.8 ' The Joint
Committee has the role of continuously reviewing the trade relationship
between the parties.88 It is also authorized to continuously review the
results and impact of the FTA and to adopt amendments to the
agreement. 89
The NAFTA provides that if the parties fail to resolve a matter within
a maximum of forty-five days, a party may request a meeting of the
Commission.9" The purpose of this meeting is to resolve the dispute and
avoid further action.9" Unlike the Joint Committee, the Commission is
85. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 219.
86. FTA, supra note 1, art. 17:1.
87. FTA, supra note 1, art. 17:2(b).
99. FTA, supra xote 1, att. 17"1.
89. FTA, supra note 1, art. 17:2(c).
90. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2007:1(b).
91. BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA: A CONCISI USER'S GUIDE TO THE
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specifically provided with clear guidelines to follow when exercising its
jurisdiction. It may call on technical advisors or create working groups to
aid in fulfilling its functions. 92  The Commission may make
recommendations to assist the consulting parties in reaching a mutually
satisfying resolution of the dispute. 93 An important addition to the NAFTA
is the authorization to use alternative dispute settlement mechanisms,
including good offices, conciliation, mediation and expert advise.94 The
procedure under the NAFTA provision is more expedient in relation to the
FTA provision. The NAFTA Commission has thirty days to resolve the
dispute, while the FTA Joint Committee has sixty days before it refers the
issue to a panel. 95
4. The Adversarial Phase
a. Panel Proceedings
If consultations fail because the parties are not able to resolve their
dispute within the specified time limit, then the Joint Committee and the
Commission refer the dispute to a panel for resolution.96 This if often
referred to as the adversarial phase of dispute resolution. The initiation of
the panel process is similar under both agreements. 97 However, unlike the
NAFTA panel process, under the FTA, a party does not have to give the
other party notice of its request to initiate the panel procedure. 98
This difference between the Agreements is not insignificant. Under the
FTA, each party has to appoint a member within fifteen days from the date
of the referral. 99 Thus, a situation may arise where one party applies to
have the matter in dispute referred to a panel without notifying the other
party. The fifteen days may lapse without the other party knowing about
NAFTA 147 (1994).
92. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2007.
93. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2007:5(c).
94. NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 2005-2007.
95. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2008(a); FIA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(d). Note that the
sixty day time limit under the FTA is unjustifiably long since the consultation phase was
unlimited in time.
96. FTA, supra note I art. 19; NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2007.
97. FTA, supra note I art. 19; NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2007.
98. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2008:1(c); see Azrieli, supra note 28, at 222; see also
infra app. I.
99. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(d).
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any such referral. This essentially means that the other party has the onus
to discover whether there was a referral to a panel. Such a situation is in
stark contrast to any existing fair court procedure, as prior notification is
always required before one may resort to the civil justice system.
Furthermore, Article 19:1(c) of the FTA does not provide any time limit
as to when a referral to a panel may be made.' 0 Potentially, such a referral
could be made any time after consultations. In such a situation, the fifteen
day time period allocated for appointing the members of the panel is
meaningless unless the non-complaining party inquires daily as to whether
the matter has been referred. Unlike the FTA, the NAFTA avoids this flaw
by requiring mandatory delivery of the request to the opposing party and
assigning this date as the beginning of the panel process.'0 '
b. Composition and Selection of the Panel
The FTA provides that the dispute resolution panel shall be composed
of three members. 2 Each party appoints one member and the two
appointees appoint a third member to serve as the Chair.'0 3 The NAFTA
Chapter 20 panel selection process introduces an innovative system
whereby a party selects two panelists from nationals of the other party."°
The Chair of the panel is mutually agreed upon by the parties within
fifteen days from the notification of the request for a panel.'0 5
The selection of members from nationals of the other party under the
NAFTA is aimed at guaranteeing high quality and unbiased panelists. It is
not unreasonable to assume that under the FTA, disputing parties will be
tempted to select panelists based on a political basis rather than on merit
100. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(c).
101. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2008:2. Note also that notifying the non-complaining
party that the complaining party has decided to resort to a panel of arbitrators is a
requirement under other international agreements. See Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, art. (5)(1)(b), 14 I.L.M. 336, 337;
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION COMMISSION
art. 3; INTERNATIONAL CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, Pub. No. 447, art. 3(I), RULE OF
CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, reprinted in 2 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INT'L ECON. L.
1041 (1990).
102. FTA., suprawote 1, 3it. 19-(d).
103. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(d).
104. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2008:2.
105. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2011. See infra app. I.
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or qualifications. One must remember that a successful and efficient panel,
like any arbitral system, must assume impartiality of its panelists.1
0 6
The time period allocated for panel selection under the NAFTA is not
more than thirty-five days.0 7 The process of the panel selection under the
FTA is to be completed within forty-five days from the date of referral.' 8
As discussed above, since there is no deadline for referral, it is unclear
when the process is to be completed under the FTA.
Under the NAFTA, the process of panel selection guarantees the
objectivity and reliability of the panel members. Article 2009 provides that
both parties must establish and maintain a roster of up to thirty individuals
who are willing and able to serve as panelists.0 9 The roster members are
appointed by consensus." 0 The members must be independent and must
not be affiliated with, or take instruction from any party."' This will, most
likely, not be the case under the FTA as it does not provide any similar
guidelines. The NAFTA also requires each panelist to have expertise or
experience in law, international trade or the resolution of disputes arising
under international trade agreements." 2 Each member must be chosen
objectively based on these requirements. The FTA does not deal with the
qualifications or expertise of panelists, nor does it set any guidelines for
the parties in the performance of their duty to appoint panel members." 3
Furthermore, the professional ethics of the NAFTA panelists are
subject to continuous examination. The panelists must comply with the
Code of Conduct established by the Commission."4 This means that even
the appearance of partiality is unacceptable. The question of party influence
arises also in the context of the nationality of panelists." 5 Any guidelines
with respect to the nationality of a panelist are completely absent in the
FTA, so it is hard to imagine how a FTA panel would be impartial or even
appear impartial. 1
6
106. Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 69, at 39.
107. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2011:1(b),(c).
108. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(d).
109. Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 69, at 39.
110. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2009:1.
111. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2009:2(a),(b).
112. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2009:2(a).
113. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 19.
114. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2009"2(c).
115. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 224.
116. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 224. Note that the NAFIA provides also for a panel
selection process where there are more than two parties to the dispute. NAFTA, supra note
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c. Rules of Procedure
Both the FTA and NAFTA panel decisions are non-binding." 17 This is
also true with respect to the rules of procedure adopted by the FTA panel.
The FTA provides no more than a vague reference to the rules of
procedure which the panel must follow as "[t]he panel shall establish its
own rules of procedure."
'" 8
The NAFTA provision is more detailed as to the panel procedure.
Model Rules of Procedure are established by the Commission.19 The
Commission, however, must establish procedures that "assure a right to at
least one hearing before the Panel, as well as the opportunity to provide
initial and rebuttal written submissions."'' 20 A NAFTA panel may seek
information and technical advice from any person or body that it deems
appropriate, provided that the disputing parties agree to such a request.'
2'
As a further improvement on the FTA, the NAFTA allows a panel to
request that a scientific review board provide a written report to assist the
panel on factual issues concerning the environment, health or safety.
2 2
These boards may be convened by either the panel or a party to the
dispute. 2 13 In addition, the board must be selected from "highly qualified,
independent experts in the scientific matter [of the dispute].' 24
As previously noted, in most cases, the initiation of the panel marks
the end of attempts to achieve a settlement by way of consultations and
mutual agreement. When parties choose to proceed to the adversarial forum
of dispute resolution, each party will attempt to present its position most
vigorously. The FTA lacks guidelines for forming rules of procedure and
lacks the possibility to request outside advise on technical issues or
scientific questions. This is not a natural part of an adversarial system.
Each party to the dispute has opposing interests. It is somehow anomalous
to ask opposing parties to establish a set of procedural rules which may
4, art. 2011:2. Discussion of this procedure is beyond the scope of this paper.
117. See infra note 127.
118. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(d).
119. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2012.
120. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2012:1(a).
121. NAFFA, supra note 4, art. 2014.
122. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2015:1; see also J.R. Holbein, Trade Agreements and
Dispute Settlements Mechanism in the Weslern Hemisphere, 2.5 CASE W. RS. 3. I,1N'l
L. 531, 561 (1993).
123. NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2015.
124. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2015:2.
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have a direct effect on the position of the parties. Such an approach
requires consultation, though this time it is with respect to the
establishment of rules. It is unreasonable, however, to expect voluntary
agreement on such issues in every case. Both parties will tend to advance
arguments to establish rules according to their interest with little attention
placed on a bonafide negotiation of appropriate procedures. Moreover, this
discretionary approach is likely insufficient to protect the interests of the
economically smaller party, namely, Israel. 2 Thus, opting into the FTA
panel process as a means to resolve trade disputes does not ensure that this
arbitration process will be effective. In fact, the FTA has established both
a passive and powerless form of arbitration.
26
5. Reports and Decisions
a. General
Under both the NAFTA and FTA, panel decisions are not binding.1
27
This is likely a result of the fact that signatories to both Agreements have
strong views on sovereignty and place a high priority on preserving it.'
21
The non-binding system of dispute resolution is to be contrasted with the
binding system that is applied in the European Union. The European Union
is more effective from the standpoint of enforceability, but the trade-off is
a surrender of part of the sovereignty of its members. 129 Since both the
NAFTA and FTA were not intended to create a common market, the
parties have opted for looser and less intrusive arrangements. 3
125. PERSPECTIVES ON A U.S.-CANADIAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 97 (R.M. Stem et
al. eds., The Brookings Institution 1987).
126. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 251.
127. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:2; NAFTA, supra note 4, Ch. 20. Note that in contrast
to NAFTA Chapter 20, a panel report under Chapter 19 of NAFTA is binding. NAFTA,
supra note 4, art. 1904:4.
128. See generally JAN R. JOHNSON, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE § 1.2 (1994) (stating that the Canadian approach to U.S.-Canada
relations has been "good fences make good neighbours").
129. Id.
130. See generally id.
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b. Time and Composition of the Reports
After a panel is established under the NAFTA, it must present an
initial report within ninety days.13 ' This report is based on the submissions
and arguments provided by the parties. 132 The initial report must contain
findings of fact, determinations as to whether the measure at issue is valid,
and recommendations for resolution of the dispute.'33 After the presentation
of the initial report, the panel has thirty days to prepare and present a final
report. 134 In contrast, the FTA provides for the preparation of "a report" by
the panel.135 The FTA panel report contains generally the same information
and recommendations as the NAFTA's initial report.
The FTA and the NAFTA schemes are similar with the exception that
the FTA does not require the production of an initial report. 36 The
significance of this difference is not marginal. Under each agreement, panel
reports are final and not subject to appeal.'37 However, under Article
2016:4 of the NAFTA, a disputing party may submit written comments to
the panel's initial report. 38 The panel may reconsider its initial report and
make further examinations. 39 Thus, under the NAFTA, there is an
opportunity for the disputing parties to seek re-examination of the decision.
This is not so under the ,FTA. Once the FTA report is released, it is not
subject to any further examination. 140
c. Implementation of panel reports
As was mentioned previously, both the FTA and NAFTA panel
decisions are non-binding. Nevertheless, although the FTA literally
provides that the report of the panel is non-binding,' 4 ' the NAFTA
provision provides that the disputing parties shall agree on the resolution
131. NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2016:2.
132. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2016:1.
133. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2016:2(a)-(c).
134. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2017.
135. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(e).
136. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(e).
137. JOHNSON, supra note 128, at §§ 11.2(8), (10)(a).
138. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2016:4.
139. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2016:5.
140. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 19.
141. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:1(e).
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of the dispute based of the report's recommendations. 142 The FTA
provision manifests the non-binding nature of the report, while the NAFTA
provision attempts to bring the parties together into accepting the
resolution. Although the bottom line is that both agreements are non-
binding, it is safe to say that panel decisions that require concessions by
the U.S. have a better prospect of being adhered to if rendered by a
NAFTA panel rather than an FTA panel.
d. Retaliation
The next consideration is with respect to the countermeasures available
when a panel decision is rendered and the losing party refuses to
implement its recommendations. Here again, the FTA lacks sufficient
guidelines to direct the complaining party as to what countermeasures are
available.'43 Under the NAFTA Article 2019:1, "the complaining party may
suspend the application of benefits of equivalent effect until such time as
they have reached an agreement on the resolution of the dispute."'
'
Article 2019:2 of the NAFTA is more specific with respect to the
particular benefits that are available for the purpose of Article 2019:1. The
benefits suspended should be, if possible, "in the same sector or sectors
affected by the measure or other matters that the panel has found to be
inconsistent with the obligations of the NAFTA or to have caused
nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex 2004." 145 Furthermore,
on a written request of a disputing party, another panel may be established
to determine whether the level of benefits suspended by a party in such
circumstances is "manifestly excessive.' ' 46 Surprisingly, the FTA refers to
the issue of countermeasures in the following words: "[a]fter a dispute has
been referred to a panel and the panel has presented its report, the affected
party shall be entitled to take any appropriate measure." 47 [emphasis
added]. Obviously, such a provision does not provide enough information
for the complaining party to determine which countermeasure is appropriate
to use in retaliation against the non-conforming party. It is unclear who
decides what constitutes an appropriate measure: the panel, the complaining
party or the other party. Further, there are no guidelines as to when it is
142. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2018:1.
143. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 19.
144. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2019:1.
145. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2019:2(a).
146. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2019:3.
147. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19:2.
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appropriate to invoke a countermeasure. Can the countermeasures be in
any sector? Must the countermeasure implemented have an effect
proportional to the damage caused by the measures taken by the loosing
party or, in other words, may they be compensatory in nature? Perhaps
"appropriate" justifies any countermeasures, including ones that are
disproportionate, as long as they are aimed at forcing the other party to
implement the report. Fittally, utlike the drafters of the NAFTA, the
drafters of the FTA did not find it necessary to provide for an examination
and determination of whether the level of countermeasures already imposed
by the complaining party is inappropriate.
e. Publication
Publication of panel reports is important for two reasons. First,
publication of the panel report makes the decision public, and therefore,
makes it possible for the winning party to foster sympathetic public
opinion among other states as well as within the public of the opposing
party."' Secondly, the publication of reports, in general, creates and
develops trade law. It is, essentially, an instrument to create jurisprudence
capable of providing some guidelines for future dispute settlements.
Article 2017:2 of the NAFTA provides that the panel report shall be
published fifteen days after it is transmitted to the Commission. 49 The FTA
does not provide for panel report publication. It seems that the draftsmen
of the FTA were, again, too preoccupied with the non-binding nature of the
agreement. The failure to include an express provision requiring publication
of panel decisions has a detrimental effect on encouraging the losing party
to comply with the resolution.
This flaw in the FTA harms Israel more than the U.S. Usually the
smaller and weaker party in the dispute should insist on a provision that
provides for publication of panel decisions. By virtue of Israel's economic
dependence on the U.S., the U.S. has the means to leave Israel with no
choice but to comply with a decision. Similarly, if Israel is declared the
winning party in a panel decision, there is no institution to which Israel
may turn when facing a refusal by the U.S. to implement the resolution.
Consequently, the U.S. could in fact be the winning party of any trade
dispute.
Under the NAFTA this is not the case. Though the NAFTA panel
decision is non-binding, there is still a way to enforce the report through
148. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 232.
149. NAFrA, supra note 4.
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public awareness and by convincing the losing party that the
implementation of the panel report is consistent with its interests.'
Arguably, the non-binding nature of the panel decision may indicate that
a party is not likely to obey the report "when it really hurts."' 5 ' Thus, it is
not mistaken to assume that under the FTA this means that the losing party
will prefer to disobey the report when it might hurt its own interest with
respect to the subject matter of the dispute. This is not so under the
NAFTA Chapter 20 because the publication requirement adds another
dimension to what "really hurts" -the public discomfort resulting from
non-compliance with report publication.
The FTA emphasizes the non-binding nature of panel reports and
procedure such that it encourages a losing party to disobey it. For example,
if a panel report indicates that the U.S. had imposed measures inconsistent
with the FTA, and therefore requires it to retract those measures, the U.S.
would have an incentive to disobey the report if obeying it does nothing
but hurt the U.S.'s economic interest. As previously mentioned, because
Israel is by far the smaller and weaker party, it will be unable to take
effective countermeasures. Report publication would, potentially, bring
public awareness and pressure to conform to the panel decision.'52 Finally,
because report publication creates guidance for trade, it may also prevent
future conflicts by providing guidance to parties on how to draft future
agreements as well as how to implement new and acceptable measures.
V. CONCLUSION
The FTA is a product of the special political and economic
relationship that existed and continues to exist between the U.S. and Israel.
The Agreement may get high marks as a political agreement, however, it
gets low marks as a model aimed at advancing a policy of trade
liberalization. The discussion above illustrates how unlikely it would be to
achieve and enforce any resolution based on a FTA model dispute
settlement mechanism. Perhaps the strong political relationship between
Israel and the U.S will compensate for the deficiencies in the FTA dispute
mechanisms. Political relationships, however, vary by definition, and in the
case of a real trade dispute between the two parties, the political
relationship may be disregarded.
150. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 233.
151. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 97 (2nd ed.
1979).
152. Azrieli, supra note 28, at 232.
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The above discussion of the dispute mechanisms under both the FTA
and the NAFTA indicates a substantial need to amend the FTA. Compared
to the FTA, the NAFTA mechanism is more advantageous in almost every
aspect. Although decisions under both mechanisms are non-binding, the
NAFTA mechanism has other desirable characteristics of dispute resolution
regimes: tight deadlines, a panel selection process that facilitates high-
quality decisions, means for re-examination of decisions to protect the
integrity of the system and a procedure that guarantees impartiality. An
effective dispute resolution mechanism is designed to prevent and resolve
conflicts of interest. Thus, it is essential to the success of both agreements.
With the completion of the Uruguay Round, the U.S. is likely to
approach its trade liberalization policy by primarily pursuing multilateral
agreements. In the alternative, the U.S. may opt to negotiate new free trade
agreements with other countries. A combination of these two strategies
would produce the best results as each has different advantages. The
multilateral route would result in a single package of concessions which
would be agreed upon by all the signatories. However, in order to extend
the reach of trade liberalization, free trade agreements would be necessary.
The reason for this is that multilateral agreements tend to pull towards the
lowest common denominator of interests of their signatories.
One thing is certain, it is essential to equip any trade agreement which
is not political in nature, and which is aimed at trade and economic
liberalization, with a competent dispute resolution process. The NAIFTA is
a proof that the U.S. is heading in this right direction.
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